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the problem in reaching the more desirable result that would afford
injured longshoremen the inclusive type coverage.
Hopefully, the decision in Marine Stevedoring is not indicative of
an incipient trend toward a further increase of judicial legislation
through interpretation of the Longshoremen's Act. Congress alone
must act to rectify the incongruities in the Act. Yet given prolonged
congressional silence in this area, the courts may well continue to ignore the bounds of judicially permissible activity in order to effect
a more certain system of compensation for injured longshoremen.
JAMES

K.

CLUVERIUS

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACTMEASURE OF DAMAGES IN ACTION AGAINST
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT.
The Federal Employees' Compensation Act provides for a recovery
against the United States when a federal employee is injured in the
course of his employment.' The employee's exclusive remedy under
the Act is a proceeding to obtain compensation which is paid regardless of any showing of fault.2 However, where the negligence of a
third party has contributed to the injury, the employee's cause of
action against that tortfeasor is preserved.8 In such a suit, the third
party may attempt to implead the United States in an effort to obtain
either contribution or indemnity. When this attempt is unsuccessful
and a verdict is rendered for the employee against the third party,
the problem becomes one of determining what proportion of the
total damages should be assessed against this defendant.
In Murray v. United States, 4 a government employee was injured
in a falling elevator in a building leased by the United States. After
having received benefits under FECA, she sued the lessor of the build'Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 81o2 (Supp. III 1968). Hereinafter referred to as FECA.
2
1d. § 8i6(c); see United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966); Patterson v.
United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959); Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952);
Sanders v. United States, 387 F.2d 142 ( 5 th Cir. 1967).
3Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8131 (Supp. III 1968).
4405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

1969]

CASE COMMENTS

ing alleging negligence. Relying on the Federal Tort Claims Act,1the lessor sought to implead the United States pursuant to Rule 14 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 The lessor advanced two
separate claims: one for contribution and the other for indemnity.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of these claims.
While the District of Columbia recognizes the doctrine of contribution between joint tortfeasors, 7 the doctrine is limited by the
principle that there can be contribution only where there is joint
liability in tort to the plaintiff by both defendants. 8 The liability of the
United States under FECA is separate and exclusive. 9 Therefore, as
a matter of law, the government is not a joint tortfeasor with the
third party, and contribution cannot be permitted since there is no
common liability to the employee. 10 Thus the court held that the
exclusive liability provision of FECA prohibited a claim against the
government for contribution.'1
c"The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances...." Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 (1964) (emphasis added). It has been held that by virtue of this Act, the
government has consented to be impleaded in an action for contribution. United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). However, the government cannot
be impleaded in a case where a private party could not be impleaded under the
local law. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); cf. United
States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (5 th Cir. 1953); Ford v. United States, Roo F.2d 272

(0oth Cir.

1952).

"At any time after commencement of the action a defending party . . . may
cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him." FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
7George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
bYellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 195o).
"T'he Act provides that "[t]he liability of the United States ...is exclusive
and instead of all other liability of the United States...." with respect to an
employee covered by the statute. Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 8116(c) (Supp. III 1968).
10Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1964). Where the United
States is not liable in tort to the employee, it cannot be held liable in contribution
for his injuries. Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967). Similar results are
reached under state workmen's compensation acts with exclusive liability provisions
and under the federal Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1964), which contains an exclusive liability provision
"nearly identical to ... the Federal Employees' Compensation Act...." Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 602 (1963). See American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950); Coates v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1951); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vallendingham,
94 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 195o).
UA contrary result was reached by the Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963), where it was held that the exclusive
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The lessor also claimed indemnity from the United States on the
theory that the government had impliedly contracted to maintain
the premises in a safe manner.12 Such a claim would not be barred
by the exclusive liability provisions of FECA. 13 However, the claim
here was barred by the Tucker Act 1 4 which limits district court
liability provision of FECA did not limit the admiralty rule of divided damages
in collisions involving mutual fault. The effect of the decision was to allow
contribution between a ship owner and the government-employer in spite of the
fact that the employee had recovered benefits under FECA. During the same
term of court a judgment was vacated in Treadwell Construction Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 772 (1963). The lower court had denied contribution where a
government employee covered by FECA had obtained a judgment from a thirdparty defendant. Drake v. Treadwell Constr. Co., 299 F.2d 789 ( 3 d Cir. 1962). On
remand the trial court permitted contribution and the government did not appeal.
These rulings were relied upon by a federal district court in holding that
the manufacturer of a machine, which had injured a NASA employee, could bring
a third-party action against the government nothwithstanding the provisions of
FECA. Hart v. Simons, 223 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1963). However, the ultimate
settlement between the parties dismissed the third-party claim and there was
no contribution. See Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
Subsequent cases have declined to follow the Weyerhaeuser rule and the
case has apparently been limited to claims arising in admiralty. See, e.g., Wien
Alaska Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d 736 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 940 (1967); United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (gth Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 951 (1964). Weyerhauser was distinguished in the District of Columbia
in Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1964).
The result of these recent developments is that the Weyerhaeuser-TreadwellHart line of cases should not be authoratatively relied upon by a third-party
claiming contribution from the United States where a government employee has
been injured. But see Thornock, Exclusive Remedy Provision of the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act-Fact or Fiction?, 42 MrLrrARY L. REv. 1 (1968).
1"While contribution distributes the loss among the tortfeasors, indemnity
shifts the entire burden of the loss to the tortfeasor who, either by an express
agreement or by operation of law, is found to be primarily responsible for the
injury. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 48, at 278 (3 d ed. 1964).
2The reason for this is that the basis for idemnity is not a common liability
in tort to the plaintiff, but a contractual relationship between the defendants.
Thus indemnity may be allowed even though the tort liability of the United
States to its employee has been replaced by a statutory scheme.
The clearest exception to the exclusive-liability clause [of compensation statutes] is the third party's right to enforce an express contract
whereby the employer agreed to indemnify the third party for the very
kind of loss which the third party has been made to pay to the employee.
A familiar example is the situation in which an employee is injured
because of the condition of the premises, and recovers from the landlord who leased the premises to the employer ....
A. LARSON, 2 WORKMEN'S COMENSATION § 76.41, at 235-36 (1968).
See also with respect to implied contracts of indemnity, Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); United Air Lines v. Wiener,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of:
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jurisdiction to contract claims not exceeding $1o,ooo.15 In addition,

the court refused to decide the issue with respect to the lessor's
claim for noncontractual indemnity as it was not briefed "except
in summary, undeveloped and unsupported terms."'16
Once it has been determined that the third party is entitled to
neither contribution nor indemnity, it is necessary to consider the
basis to be used in determining the amount which the injured plaintiff
will be entitled to recover in his suit against the negligent third
party. This is a crucial consideration because a jury verdict may be
greatly in excess of the statutory compensation. 17 The court in Murray
stated that damages against the lessor-defendant would be "limited
to one-half of the amount of damages sustained by [the] plaintiff,
assuming the facts would have entitled the owner to contribution
from the employer if the statute had not interposed a bar."' 8 This
rule was justified on the ground that FECA gave an assured recovery
to the employee regardless of any showing of fault.
In reaching its decsion, the court relied upon Martello v. Hawley, 9
which involved a collision between two automobiles. The plaintiff,
after entering into a settlment agreement with the driver of one
automobile, proceeded to bring suit against the owner of the other
(--) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not
exceeding $io,ooo in amount, founded... upon any express or implied
contract with the United States ....
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1964).
l"Appellant's brief says it is possible for a verdict to be rendered for less
that $xo,ooo, but since there obviously was and is no intent to limit the idemnity
claim to this amount, this is without significance." Murray v. United States,
405 F.2d 1361, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
-The court noted however that the cases in this area appear to be in conflict.
Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The most articulate
view, and probably the prevailing one as well, is that a claim for noncontractual
indemnity stands on the same ground as a claim for contribution in tort and
is similarly barred by the exclusive liability provisions of FECA. Thus the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that "a claim for noncontractual tort indemnity can be maintained only where there is tort liability
on the part of the indemnitor to the person injured." Wien Alaska Air Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d 736, 737 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1967)Accord, United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 951 (1964).
nTSee, e.g., American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 195o),
as noted in A. LARSON, 2 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 7610, at 229 (1968), where
the employee's statutory recovery was $6,8oo while the jury assessed his damages
at $6o,ooo.
"n4o5 F.2d at 1366.
13oo F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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automobile. 20 The judgment was more than twice the amount of
the settlement and the judgment-defendant sought contribution from
the settling-defendant. The court held that the judgment-defendant
was required to pay only one-half of the total verdict.21 While recognizing that this result necessarily reduced the plaintiff's recovery, the
court indicated that "by his settlement, the plaintiff has sold onehalf of his claim for damages. Anything else would be unfair to the
settling tort-feasor, who has bought his peace ....-22 The underlying policy reason for such a rule is the apparent desire to encourage
settlements. 23 If contribution were allowed the settlment would be
meaningless since it would only be a final determination of maximum
liability where the verdict against the judgment-defendant was equal
24
to or less than twice the amount of the settlement.
In extending the result of the settlement cases to the principal
case, Murray focuses on the fact that contribution is not permitted
in either situation, while ignoring the basic and inherent differences
between the two situations. A close examination of the situation
where the plaintiff is covered by a compensation act will demonstrate that the Martello rule is distinguishable and should be limited
to cases where there has been a voluntary settlement between the
parties.
Under FECA, the employee has an assured recovery; whereas
there is no such assurance in the settlement situation, nor can the
xNo statutory compensation scheme was involved.
-1"[W]e now hold in the factual circumstances of this case that when settlement is made with one joint tort-feasor and later a verdict is obtained against
the other, and the jury finds that the settling tort-feasor should contribute,... the
defendant tort-feasor should be required to pay only ...one-half the total original
verdict." Martello v. Hawley, 3oo F.2d 721, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (emphasis added).
See also Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
-23oo F.2d at 724.
""[The settlement compromise] must be given effect to relieve [the settling
defendant] from all liability... otherwise persons in [a] similar position will not
be likely to make compromises." McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 665 (D.C.
Cir. 1943).
mSuppose that the plaintiff settled with defendant A for $5,ooo and received
a judgment against defendant B for more than twice the amount of the settlement,
e.g., $12,000. If the settlement is to be given full effect, A cannot be required
to pay more than $5,ooo. But, if contribution is allowed each defendant will be
required to pay one-half of the verdict, or $6,ooo. Thus A's liability would
exceed the amount agreed upon in the settlement and the settlement would have
no effect as a final determination of A's maximum liability.
On the other hand, where the verdict is equal to twice the amount of the
settlement, i.e., $lo,ooo, there is no problem in allowing contribution, since each
defendant would be liable for only $5,ooo. Where the verdict is for less than
twice the settlement, e.g., $8,ooo, and contribution is permitted, each defendant
would pay only $4,ooo. Thus A's liability would not exceed the maximum amount
provided for by the settlement.
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statutory recovery be fairly treated as a settlement. The employee
is automatically entitled to a fixed amount by virtue of the fact
that the injury occurred during the course of his employment. Furthermore, FECA provides that the government is subrogated to any recovery by the employee to the extent of the compensation which has
been paid. 25 Thus, part, if not all, of the plaintiff's recovery from the
third party must be repaid to the government. However, this is
not true in the settlement situation where the plaintiff keeps his
recovery from both defendants. 26 Finally, the policy reason for the
Martello rule is inapplicable, since there is no need to adopt a result
designed to encourage settlements where both parties have their
rights and liabilities predetermined by statute.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
Parker v. Wideman,27 considered the measure of damages to be
assessed against the third party and reached a result which directly
conflicts with the Murray measure of damages. In Parker, a guard
employed by the federal government was engaged in transporting
federal prisoners. He was injured when the automobile in which he
was traveling collided with another vehicle. After having received
compensation under FECA, he sued the driver of the government's
automobile for his negligence in causing the accident. The jury found
that the defendant was liable to the employee. However, it assessed
his damages at "none" [sic] dollars presumably because the defendant
had introduced evidence that the employee had received benefits
=Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8132 (Supp. III 1968).
3For example, if the employee has received $5,ooo in compensation and
there is a judgment against the defendant for $12,000, the employee's final recovery
will be S6,ooo. The reason for this result is that under the Murray rule, the
defendant pays only one-half of the verdict, or $6,ooo. The employee must then
reimburse the government for the $5,000 which he received under FECA. Thus
he is left with only $Soooof his recovery from the defendant. This is added to
his original compensation of $5,ooo and the total recovery is $6,000. It should
be noted that under the Murray rule the employee will never recover more than
one-half of his total damages in any case where the jury's verdict exceeds twice
the amount of the compensation paid.
A very different result is reached in the settlement situation. Thus, where
the plaintiff settles with defendant A for $5,ooo and there is a judgment against
defendant B for 512,ooo, the plaintiff's total recovery will be $i1,ooo. Under the
Martello rule, B pays one-half of the verdict, or $6,ooo. This is added to the
$5,ooo which the plaintiff received in settlement from A and the total recovery
is $ii,ooo. In contrast to the result under Murray, the plaintiff here will always
recover more than one-half of his damages measured by the jury's verdict.
1'38o F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1967).
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under FECA. The court remanded the case for a trial on the sole
issue of damages on the ground that
the compensation received by the appellant [employee] under
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act does not mitigate
the damages which the appellee [third party] is obligated to
sustained by the appellant as the result of his
pay for injuries
28
negligence.
This conclusion is in accord with that reached by Oleck in his treatise
on Damages to Persons and Property, where he states that under
FECA, "[b]eneficiaries may recover full damages from the third party
for an injury sustained." 29 A similar result is also reached under state
workmen's compensation acts. 30
In enunciating its measure of damages, Murray suggests that it is
unjust to impose a greater liability on the third party where his
co-defendant is the government and contribution is barred by FECA,
than where the other tortfeasor is a private individual and contribution would be permitted. However, it should be recognized that the
Murray rule applies only where contribution from the government
would have been permitted in the abscence of FECA; i.e., where the
government's negligence is found to have contributed to the employee's
injury.
However, where two non-governmental defendants have negligently caused a single injury, each is liable for the entire amount
of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. 3 ' Thus even in the case
9Id. at 436. Thus the Fifth Circuit is in direct conflict with the District of
Columbia Circuit on this point.
2H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 4 4 4C (The Federal Employees' Compensation Act & Third Party Suits While Accepting Compensation),
at 964.20 (1961). "As any compensation paid the employee must be refunded
by the employee after he has recovered damages, the payment of such compensation
is not a defense to the suit against the third party tortfeasor; neither can it be
proved in mitigation of damages." Id. at 964.24. Research has not disclosed other
cases which have specifically discussed the measure of the employee's recovery
from the third party where the employee has also received benefits under FECA.
"See Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1964) (recognizing the rule
that damages may not be diminished on account of workmen's compensation
recoveries in Pennsylvania); Maccarone v. A/S Inger, 262 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959)
(employee's rights under workmen's compensation in New York are irrelevant
to a determination of his damages); United Gas Corp. v. Guillory, 207 F.2d 308
( 5 th Cir. 1953) (under Louisiana law a third party is liable for the full amount
of the damages suffered); Powell v. Wagner, 178 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Wis. 1959)
(compensation under Ohio law does not inure to the benefit of the defendant and
may not be considered to diminish the amount awarded by the jury).
"The REsTATEmENT OF TORTS § 879 (1939) provides that "each of two persons
who is independently guilty of tortious conduct which is a substantial factor
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where contribution is permitted, the plaintiff could bring an action
solely against the third party and recover the entire amount of his
damages from him. It is the responsibility of the defendant to secure
contribution wherever possible. The doctrine of contribution relates
to the rights and liabilities of the defendants toward each other,
and the fact that it may not be invoked in a given case should have
32
no effect upon the recovery by the plaintiff.
The major difficulty with the rule adopted in Murray is that
while the court holds that the third party is not entitled to contribution from the United States, the effect of its decision is in fact to
allow contribution when viewed through the eyes of the defendant
who pays the same amount to the plaintiff as he would in a case
where he receives contribution. 33 On the other hand, the plaintiff
can never receive more than one-half of his actual damages measured
by the jury's verdict. 3 4 As a result, the employee receives a smaller

recovery when he is employed by the United States than when he is
employed by a private corporation under a workmen's compensation
act. 35 Moreover, the employee also recovers a smaller amount in the
in causing a harm to another is liable for the entire harm ..
Comment a of that section states that:
[a] person whose tortious conduct is otherwise one of the legal causes of
an injurious result is not relieved from liability for the entire harm by
the fact that the tortious act of another responsibile person contributes
to the result. Nor are -the damages against him thereby diminished.
See also F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, TORTS § io.i, at 695-99 (1956).
a-"It is no defense for wrongdoers that others aided in causing the harm.
Each is responsible for the whole ....
Accordingly when one makes full reparation
for all the loss, the others are discharged from liability to the injured person....
Where contribution cannot be had between 'joint' tortfeasors, they are relieved
from further liability of any kind." McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 664 (D.C.
Cir. 1943).
'1This may be demonstrated by examining the result under both cases where
the jury's verdict against the defendant is for $12,ooo. If contribution were allowed, the defendant would pay the full $12,ooo, but he would receive $6,ooo, or
one-half of the verdict, from the joint tortfeasor. Thus his net liability would
be S6,ooo. Under the Murray rule, the defendant pays one-half of the verdict,
i.e. $6,ooo. In either case the defendant has the same net liability to the
plaintiff. The result is that in the Murray situation the defendant gets indirectly
what he cannot get directly. Therefore, the court permits the defendant to avoid
the consequences of the denial of contribution under FECA.
31See note 26 supra.
2In the latter case, he recovers the full amount of his damages from the
third-party defendant. See cases cited note 3o supra. Thus where a jury verdict
is for $12,00o, the employee recovers the entire amount. He then must reimburse
his employer for the compensation received. Where this was $5,ooo, the employee
pays $5,ooo back into the fund, leaving him with $7,000 from the defendant.
When this is added to the $5,ooo which he initially received as compensation, his
total recovery from the employer and the defendant is $12,000, i.e., the assessed
amount of his actual damages.
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case where the government was negligent than in the case where the
injury was caused solely by the tortious conduct of the third party.3 0
Yet, at the same time, a pecuniary benefit inures to the third party
by the fact that the individual injured was a government employee.
Ideally, the amount which the plaintiff has received under FECA
should be deducted from the jury's verdict and the third party should
be required to pay the remainder. The government would be
entitled to recover the benefits it has paid only where it can demonstrate that it was free from negligence. In that case, the third party
would directly reimburse the government by that amount.2 7 For
example, if the plaintiff received $5,000 under FECA, and the jury,
in a separate action against the third party, assessed his damages at
$20,000, the plaintiff would receive $i5,ooo from the third party.
If the United States, however, could demonstrate that it was without
fault, the third party would pay $5,000 to the compensation fund.
The end result is that the employee will be fully compensated for
his injury and the judgment-defendant will be liable for the total
damages only in the case where the injury was caused solely by his
negligence. However, it should be recognized that this result could
only be accomplished by legislative action to amend the existing
compensation statute.
In the absence of such amendment, it is nevertheless possible for
the court to reach an equitable result by changing its point of reference from the third party to the injured employee. Thus the employee
should recover the full amount of his damages from the judgmentdefendant. This will not result in a double recovery since the government will be subrogated to the recovery to the extent of the
compensation which has been paid or which is still payable. Once
again the employee will be made whole and the rule will be brought
nThe Murray rule applies only where the government would have been liable
for contribution in the absence of FECA. This means that the government must
have been negligent as contribution is allowed only where both defendants are
liable in tort to the plaintiff. We have seen that under the Murray rule the
defendant will be liable for only one-half of the judgment against him. However, where the government was not at fault, the "one-half" rule does not apply
and the defendant, being solely responsible for the injury, must pay the entire
judgment entered against him. Thus, the employee's recovery will be greater.
The result of this rule is that the employee is penalized in cases where the government was negligent. In effect, the employee is made to suffer for the negligence
of his employer, by taking a smaller recovery, nothwithstanding his guaranteed
recovery under FECA.
nIt is suggested that this would be a matter to be determined by the defendants themselves and should be of no concern to the plaintiff.

